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Abstract
We analyse how physicians respond to contractual changes and incentives within a multitasking
environment. In 1999 the Quebec government (Canada) introduced an optional mixed compensation
system, combining a ﬁxed per diem with a partial (relative to the traditional fee-for-service system)
fee for services provided. We combine panel survey and administrative data on Quebec physicians
to evaluate the impact of this change in incentives on their practice choices. We highlight the
diﬀerentiated impact of incentives on various dimensions of physician behaviour by considering a
wide range of labour supply variables: time spent on seeing patients, time devoted to teaching,
administrative tasks or research, as well as the volume of clinical services and average time per
clinical service. Our results show that, on average, the reform induced physicians who changed
from FFS to MC to reduce their volume of (billable) services by 6.15% and to reduce their hours of
work spent on seeing patients by 2.57%. Their average time spent per service increased by 3.58%,
suggesting a potential quality-quantity substitution. Also the reform induced these physicians to
increase their time spent on teaching and administrative duties (tasks not remunerated under the
fee-for-service system) by 7.9%.
Keywords: physician payment mechanisms; multitasking; mixed-payment systems; incentive con-
tracts; labour supply; self-selection; panel estimation.
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1 Introduction
The labour-supply behaviour of physicians is an important determinant of the performance of any health-
care system. Physicians make decisions on both the extensive margin, aﬀecting their time spent at work,
and the intensive margin, aﬀecting the number of services provided. What is more, physician services
are provided within a multitasking environment (Ma, 1994; Ma and McGuire, 1997)  decisions over
the number of patients treated, the time spent seeing patients and the time devoted to teaching and
to administrative tasks aﬀect the quantity as well as the quality of health care supplied. Consequently,
employers of physician services (in both the private and public sector) must be concerned with the
eﬃcient allocation of physician time and eﬀort across diﬀerent tasks.
One policy instrument which is available to address these issues is compensation design. Economists
have written extensively on payment systems and their eﬀects on individual behaviour and performance
(e.g., Hart and Holmstrom, 1987; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Within the health-economics literature,
many authors have highlighted the diﬀerent incentives in commonly used payment systems. For example,
capitation contracts can reduce the utilization of health services (Pauly, 1990), yet can lead to the under-
provision of necessary services (Blomqvist, 1991) and to the cream-skimming of patients (Newhouse,
1996).1
Empirical evidence suggests that physicians do respond to incentives. Several studies show that fee-
for-service physicians (who receive a fee for each clinical service provided) perform more clinical services
than do physicians paid a salary or capitation contract; examples include: Gaynor and Gertler (1995);
Gruber and Owings (1996); Barro and Beaulieu (2003).2 Yet, the interpretation of these results is unclear.
While the increase in services can be beneﬁcial to patients waiting for treatment, such high-powered
incentive contracts, that closely link remuneration to quantity of care, may cause physicians to see too
many patients and to neglect other tasks such as the quality of care and non-clinical activities such as
teaching and administrative duties.3 Theoretical work suggests that low-powered incentive contracts can
be optimal when some tasks are unobservable or observable only at very high costs (e.g., Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992). These contracts are often referred to as mixed-compensation contracts
in the physician compensation literature (Eggleston, 2005). They usually combine an upfront payment
(per unit of time or per patient) with a partial fee-for-service. Such contracts reduce the opportunity
cost of spending time with patients and performing administrative tasks. Their potential beneﬁt is to
encourage the provision of aspects of services (such as the quality of care) which are valued by the patient
but are unobservable to them and the (public or private) insurer (Ma and McGuire, 1997). As shown
by these authors, the eﬀect of these contracts depends on whether the quality of care and observable
services are complements or substitutes. As long as they are substitutes, increasing the upfront payment
for the quality of care (e.g., introducing a per diem) and a lower marginal payment for the quantity of
services, will encourage the physician to provide a better quality of care. Also, if time spent performing
1Under capitation contracts physicians receive a ﬁxed payment per patient (per period), independent of the services
they provide.
2See Léger (2007) for a recent review of the empirical evidence on physician compensation systems.
3Another concern is induced demand which can be exacerbated under high-powered incentive contracts. See, for
example, Gruber and Owings (1996).
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non-clinical services such as administrative duties is remunerated under the upfront payment, an increase
in this parameter may stimulate these activities.
To date, empirical work on multi-tasking issues has been limited by data constraints.4 Most data sets
contain only narrow measures of physician behaviour; e.g., the number of patients seen by a physician
(Gaynor and Gertler, 1995), the hospitalization rate of patients (Hillman et al., 1989) or the rate of
antibiotic prescription (Hutchinson and Foley, 1999). Yet, evaluating compensation contracts within a
multi-tasking context requires measuring physician behaviour along multiple dimensions. This paper
presents a step in that direction. We construct a panel of survey and administrative data to analyse the
multi-dimensional response of physicians to changes in their contracts (and incentives).
Our data come from the province of Quebec, Canada. They provide detailed information on the
labour-supply behaviour of specialist physicians working in the province over a ﬁve-year period (1996-
2000), including the number of services each physician provided, the weeks and hours each physician
worked (disaggregated into several activities), individual earnings, as well as personal characteristics.
From these data, it is also possible to construct a proxy for the quality of care provided by physicians:
the average time per clinical service.5 Importantly, our sampling period covers a major policy change
with respect to specialist physician pay. Quebec specialists were traditionally paid a fee-for-service (FFS)
contract. In 1999, the government introduced a mixed compensation system (MC) as an alternative to
the FFS system. Physicians who are paid under MC receive a base wage (or per diem), independent of
the number of services provided, and a reduced, or prorated, (vis-à-vis the FFS contract) fee-for-service.
We deﬁne the incentive ratio as the prorated fee-for-service, paid under MC, divided by the original fee-
for-service, paid under FFS. Incentive ratios less than one imply reduced incentives. The incentive ratio
averaged 41% in our sample6, suggesting that the MC system substantially altered physician incentives.
We exploit this contractual change to measure the eﬀect of incentives on various aspects of physician
labour supply: services provided, hours devoted to seeing patients, hours devoted to teaching and to
administrative tasks and income. It is noteworthy that the MC system is optional and applies only
to specialist physicians when working in health establishments (mainly hospitals). By 2000, 31.03% of
specialists were paid, at least in part, under the MC system. As discussed in Fortin et al. (2008), we
expect the reform to induce physicians who switch from FFS to MC to reduce their volume of clinical
services but also to increase their quality of care and the time they spend on non clinical activities
remunerated under the per diem.
Attributing changes in observed physicians' behaviour to changes in the compensation policy requires
controlling for a competing hypothesis that can explain the observed changes; namely that diﬀerent types
of physicians are attracted to diﬀerent compensation policies - a phenomenon known as adverse selection
in the theoretical literature and self selection in the empirical literature (Chiappori and Salanié, 2003).
Thus, one would expect the physicians who have a low productivity (in terms of quantity of care provided)
4Paarsch and Shearer (2000) treats multi-tasking issue within a manual-labour context.
5Ma and McGuire (1997) suggests the use of this variable as a proxy for the intensity or quality of treatment provided
by the physician. Of course, the measure is imperfect: it does not distinguish between time spent with patients and time
spent between patients, nor does it provide any information on its actual eﬀect on the health of patients.
6The average incentive ratio is the weighted average fraction of FFS prices paid for clinical services when performed
under MC (the weights being the relative importance of each service in 1998).
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to be more inclined to choose the MC system, ceteris paribus. The longitudinal aspect of our data allows
us to observe individual physicians under both the FFS and the MC payment systems. We use this
information to isolate changes in behaviour resulting from the change in the compensation system from
self-selection. More precisely, we estimate ﬁxed eﬀect regression models which can be regarded as a
generalization of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach. Panel models with censored data are also used
when necessary.
Our results suggest that physicians did react to the change in incentives resulting from the switch
to MC, reducing the (billable) volume of services provided by 6.15%. There is also evidence that the
change had important eﬀects on other dimensions of physician labour supply and addressed, at least
partially, multi-tasking problems associated with FFS: the time spent per service increased by 3.58%
under the MC system and the hours devoted to activities not remunerated under FFS (administrative
and teaching) increased by 7.9%. These results are qualitatively robust to various speciﬁcations of our
empirical model and sample composition, although there is evidence that the reaction to the reform
varied across gender and specialty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the institutional details
governing physician compensation in Quebec. Section 3 describes the data, the variables, the treatment
and control groups used in our empirical analysis. It also presents descriptive statistics. Section 4
explains our empirical strategy, while Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 provides a series of
robustness checks to our empirical speciﬁcation and the last section concludes.
2 Context
Health care falls under the jurisdiction of provincial governments under the Canadian constitution.
While the federal government does exert some inﬂuence on conformity to national standards through
the Canada Health Act, policies remain largely a provincial responsibility. Within the province of
Quebec, the vast majority of specialist physicians have been paid under a FFS compensation system
until 1999.7 The fees paid are service speciﬁc, accounting for the diﬃculty and time intensiveness of the
service, and apply to practices both in the public sector and in private clinics, although the latter are
administered in the private sector. They are periodically negotiated between the Quebec Government
and the Fédération des médecins spécialistes du Québec.
2.1 The Mixed Compensation scheme
In September 1999, the Quebec Government introduced the MC system for 19 out of 31 specialties. The
scheme became accessible to other specialties later in 2000. Adoption of the MC system was optional.
In hospitals, specialists work within departments, made up of physicians performing similar tasks. Upon
the introduction of the MC system, each department voted on its adoption, switching to the MC system
only if the vote passed unanimously.
7FFS compensation represented about 80% of specialists' earnings in 1999. The remaining 20% come from sessional
hours in health care establishments (almost 10%), earnings in laboratories (9%) and a very small part from salary (1%).
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The MC scheme combines a per diem, paid independently of the number of services provided, with a
prorated FFS payment. The incentive ratio (the prorated fee divided by the original FFS fee) averaged
41%, substantially altering the monetary incentives to supply services. Note as well, the incentive ratio
varied across services and specialties. At the extreme, some services were deemed non-billable under the
MC system, receiving no fee-for-service (e.g., most follow-up visits).
A number of additional conditions bear mention. First, the per diem only applies to certain activities,
principally time spent on administration, teaching and seeing patients, the most notable exclusion being
time spent on research. Research activities are typically paid by the hospital where they take place,
or through government grants. Second, the MC system is available only for activities completed in
health establishments (mainly hospitals). Hours of work and services provided within private clinics
continue to be paid under the FFS system.8 Third, services provided within hospital emergency rooms
by non emergency-room physicians are excluded from the MC system. Finally, there are restrictions
on the number of per diems a physician can claim and the time-period during which he/she can claim
them. Half per diems are claimed on a 3.5-hour basis.9 The maximum number of half per diems that
a physician can claim during a two-week period is 28 and these can only be claimed Monday to Friday
between 7AM and 5PM. Once the maximum number of per diems is reached, or when a physician works
outside the per-diem claimable hours, he/she is paid on the FFS basis.
In introducing the reform the government targeted three general goals. First, the government sought
to improve the quality of health care, increasing the amount of time physicians spend with each patient.
Second, the government sought to improve eﬃciency in the quantity of health care, reducing the marginal
gain to seeing patients unnecessarily. Finally, the government sought to induce physicians to increase
the amount of time devoted to teaching and administrative duties and to reduce inequities between
physicians devoting their time to these duties and those who do not.
2.2 Expected eﬀects of the reform
The multitasking nature of the supply of health services, whereby physicians can adjust both the quantity
and quality of services, creates non-linearities in the physicians' budget constraint. This is due to the
fact that the marginal beneﬁt of an hour worked depends on the eﬀort (or services) supplied  the
opportunity cost of leisure is not constant. This complicates the comparative-static analysis of physician
labour-supply behaviour. Fortin et al. (2008) provide an extensive theoretical analysis of the reform,
focusing on the quality/quantity trade-oﬀ in the supply of health services. Their results highlight the
general ambiguity of comparative static results within this setting. Nevertheless, economic intuition
suggests that the reduction in the fee-for-service under MC would induce physicians who switch to
MC to reduce their volume of clinical services (and clinical hours of work) and to increase the time
they spend per clinical service (quality of care). The introduction of the per diem which remunerates
8More precisely, physicians who demonstrate that there is a strong complementarity between private clinic and hospital
activities can choose to receive a per diem when working in a private clinic. However, in this case, they would not receive
any FFS payment for services performed in the clinic. Therefore most physicians choose to be paid on the FFS basis when
working in a private clinic.
9During the period under study, the half per diem was set equal to 300 CAN$.
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time spent on administrative and teaching duties can also be expected to increase time spent on these
activities. Fortin et al. (2008) derive suﬃcient conditions under which the reform will induce these eﬀects
as well as inducing physicians who switch to reduce their total (clinical and non-clinical) hours of work.
However, while these eﬀects are intuitive, the suﬃcient conditions supporting them are not; they rely on
a complex interaction between the non-linearities in the budget constraint and the indiﬀerence curves.
The ambiguities that are inherent in such non-linear models give added importance to empirical work
analyzing the eﬀects of the reform.10
3 Data and Variables
3.1 Data
Our data contains information on the practice patterns and individual characteristics of physicians
practising in Quebec between 1996 and 2002.11 These data come from two sources. First, each year,
the Collège des médecins du Québec (CMQ) conducts a survey of its members. This survey contains
information on individual characteristics such as specialty, age and gender, as well as establishment
and geographic characteristics. The survey also contains time-use information, namely, time spent at
work, time devoted to seeing patients in establishments or private clinics, time devoted to teaching,
administrative duties and research activities (all measured as hours per working week, averaged over the
whole year).
The fact that we use self-reported measures of physicians' use of their time raises the question
of measurement errors and its consequences for the empirical analysis. Two potential problems arise.
First, we may be using imprecise measures of the hours actually worked by physicians. This will lead to
consistent but less precise estimates of the coeﬃcients of the model, something shared by most empirical
research on labour supply (e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). A second, more serious, diﬃculty will
occur if the measurement errors in the self-reported data are correlated with the explanatory variables.
In particular, if switching to MC induces a distortion in the way hours are reported, the estimates of
the impact of the reform will be inconsistent, unduly attributing the change in reported hours (for a
given level of actual hours of work) to the reform itself. However this problem is unlikely to occur here
since our time-use data were collected by a professional organization (CMQ) which is not in any way
responsible for physician compensation. Although physicians may have an incentive to misrepresent
their hours of work to the organisation that administers their pay (the Régie de l'assurance-maladie du
Québec, RAMQ), they have no incentive to do so to the CMQ.
10The model in Fortin et al. (2008) was developed to analyse this particular reform. It allows a much richer choice set
for physicians than in Ma and McGuire (1997), including services performed, hours worked and on-the-job leisure. This
added complexity explains the lack of intuition over the results.
11We ignore data from 2001 and 2002 in our analysis since there was an increase in fees paid to physicians (in the order
of 11%, on average) at the beginning of 2001. Given we are not estimating a structural model, adding these data would
not likely add to our analysis of the eﬀect of the reform but would rather identify the diﬀerence in reaction to the changes
in fees between the treatment and the control groups. While of interest in itself, we prefer to leave such an analysis for
future research.
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Our second source of data is the RAMQ. This source provides very precise information on the
practice intensity of physicians  our data come directly from the administrative ﬁles used to compensate
physicians. In particular, we observe the income and the number of services provided on a quarterly
basis for each physician. The data from the annual surveys and from the RAMQ were matched on the
basis of an anonymous number attributed to each physician. This also allowed us to keep track of each
physician in our sample across time periods.
3.2 Variables
Typically, physicians provide a variety of services, each remunerated at (possibly) diﬀerent rates. To
construct a measure of the volume of services supplied, we aggregated services together to generate an
annual quantity index of services (weighted by the basic fees in 2000).12 Recall that the government
designated some services as non-billable under the MC system. Since our data come from the billing
records of physicians, these services are unobservable when they are performed under MC. We have
therefore decided to exclude them from our measure of clinical services for all physicians over the sampling
period, concentrating solely on billable services. Including non-billable services would have created an
upward bias in the impact of the reform on the volume of services since they disappear after the reform.
As long as the reform does not induce physicians under MC to substitute too much across various clinical
services, our measure of the eﬀect (in %) of the reform on the volume of total clinical services will not
be strongly aﬀected by their exclusion. If the reform induces MC physicians to substitute billable for
non-billable clinical services, our results can be interpreted as a lower bound of its eﬀect (both in % and
in absolute value) on the volume of total clinical services.
Our income variable diﬀers from the gain the physician derives from practice due to two further
institutional factors: income ceilings and regional-practice compensating diﬀerentials. Two types of
income ceilings were active during the sampling period. The ﬁrst is a ceiling on the net income a specialist
could earn in a private clinic during a given semester. The net income on which the ceiling applies is
deﬁned as 65% of income earned by the physician in private clinics and allows the physician to net out
expenses. Second, up until 1999, the government also imposed a ceiling on gross income (independent of
where it was earned). In both cases, once the relevant income attains the ceiling, payments to physicians
are reduced by 75% from their regular levels.13 Regionally diﬀerentiated compensation rates apply to
the resulting income. A premium was oﬀered to younger physicians settled in some designated regions
during the period under study (see Bolduc et al., 1996, for more detail).
3.3 Deﬁnition of Sample, Treatment, and Control Groups
Since we focus on a comparison between the FFS and MC schemes, we dropped from our sample all
physicians who received less than 100% of their earned income under these schemes over the sample pe-
12The formula for calculating the volume of services for a physician i at year t is given by Σmj=1p
2000
j S
t
ij , where m is the
number of diﬀerent services, p2000j is the basic fee for service j in 2000, and S
t
ij is the number of services j performed by
physician i at time t.
13We show in Section 6.4 that our results should not be aﬀected by this rule.
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riod. Physicians in specialties, such as geriatrics, psychiatry and public health, who receive an important
part of their income from salary were therefore excluded. We also excluded physicians who are never
observed under the FFS system. This excludes some young physicians who begin their career during the
sample period and are only observed under the MC system.
In order to analyse the eﬀect of the reform, we divided our sample into treatment and control groups.
Our deﬁnition of these groups centered around the physician's participation in the MC system once it
became available in the year 2000. A natural criterion would have been to condition treatment on
being remunerated under MC. However, due to the particular setting of the reform (see Section 2),
changing from FFS to MC does not exclude practicing under FFS (e.g., during particular hours of the
day, in emergency rooms or in private clinics). We thus deﬁned the treatment group as those physicians
who were compensated in part under MC in every quarter of 2000. Similarly, the control group is
deﬁned as those physicians being remunerated exclusively by FFS in every quarter of 2000. Physicians
who did not match these criteria were excluded from the sample.14 Such a restrictive deﬁnition of the
treatment and control groups is aimed at building as homogeneous groups as possible.15 This same
objective also lead us to exclude some observations from the study. First, the following laboratory
specialties were excluded: anatomopathology, medical biochemistry, medical microbiology and nuclear
medicine. Moreover, the MC scheme was introduced later in 2000 for cardiac and vascular surgery,
internal medicine, otorhinolaryngology, physiatry, radiology and urology. Therefore these specialties
were also dropped from our analysis. Finally, ophthalmology was removed from our sample since very
few physicians of this specialty chose MC. Their participation rate to MC was only 2% in 2000. We
are, therefore, left with the following specialties in our sample : anesthesiology, cardiology, dermatology,
endocrinology, gastroenterology, general surgery, gynecology and obstetrics, nephrology, neurosurgery,
neurology, orthopaedics, pediatrics, pneumology, radio-oncology, and rheumatology. The ﬁnal sample
contains 2 120 physicians, down from 8 549 specialist physicians in the initial database.16
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides information concerning the number of physicians in each specialty in our sample as
well as the participation rates in the MC scheme (the proportion of physicians who switched to MC) in
1999 and 2000. Of the 2 120 physicians in our sample, 423 are in the treatment group (they switched
to MC) and 1 697 are in the control group (they remained in FFS). There are 1 655 males and 464
females. Cardiology (260 physicians), General surgery (259 physicians) and Pediatrics (253 physicians)
are the largest specialties, while Radiation Oncology (30 physicians), Neurosurgery (31 physicians) and
Rheumatology (44 physicians) are the smallest specialties.
14To account for changes in practice behaviour in 1999 for the physicians who changed from FFS to MC in the last
quarter of 1999, we introduced a dummy variable identifying these treated individuals in the regressions for clinical services
and income since those variables are measured over calendar years. By contrast, time-use variables do not overlap with
the reform in 1999 since the CMQ surveys are conducted in July while the reform was introduced in September.
15In Section 6.1, we show our results are quite robust with respect to other deﬁnitions.
16 The specialities included in our sample accounts for close to 50% of total specialities, over the period covered by our
initial data base (see the ﬁrst column of Table 1).
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Table 1: Mixed Compensation System characteristics in 1999 and 2000
Percentage of total MC participation rate Number of MC Incentive Ratio
specialists 1999 2000 physicians Excluding NBS Including NBS
Anesthesiology 7.61 23.12 32.75 229 31.01 30.90
Cardiology 4.18 2.20 6.92 260 44.32 34.45
General Surgery 6.77 14.29 18.15 259 48.10 35.33
Orthopedic Surgery 4.02 6.96 9.24 184 45.87 38.84
Dermatology 2.26 16.39 17.99 139 53.53 32.98
Gastroenterology 1.99 1.82 2.59 116 75.00 31.24
Obstr. + Gynec. 5.17 4.08 6.39 219 40.04 37.14
Pneumology 2.12 5.19 5.95 84 79.00 18.60
Neurosurgery 0.84 75.86 83.87 31 70.66 52.99
Neurology 2.51 9.09 10.83 120 28.60 24.01
Pediatrics 7.46 27.88 43.48 253 30.00 14.27
Radiation Oncology 0.75 47.62 70.00 30 79.00 54.00
Nephrology 1.50 4.41 5.19 77 34.00 21.43
Endocrinology 1.67 22.73 24.00 75 28.00 20.30
Rheumatology 0.91 41.46 61.36 44 45.23 36.12
Total 49.77 14.04 19.95 2120 41.19 30.80
Note: For each specialty, the ﬁrst column reports the proportion (in %) of all specialists in the initial data base (19962002). The two
next columns report the proportion (in %) of physicians who chose MC in our sample. The number of physicians for each specialty
in 1999 and 2000 is reported in the fourth column. The last two columns provide the average incentive ratio (in %) associated with
MC  namely the weighted average fraction of FFS prices paid for clinical services when performed under MC (the weights being the
relative importance of each service in 1998) calculated either over only those services for which the prorated fee is positive, hence
excluding non-billable Services (fourth column) over all services (last column), whether they are billable or not. The MC Incentive
Ratio is the ratio of the prorated fee-for-service, paid under MC, to the original fee-for-service, paid under FFS.
The participation rate to MC strongly varies across specialties (from 2.59% for gastroenterology to
83.87% for neurosurgery in 2000). Two reasons may explain this result. First, the average incentive
ratios vary from one specialty to another. For example, in neurosurgery, services are compensated
at a relatively high incentive ratio (including non-billable services) of 53%. Similarly, in radiation
oncology where the MC participation rate are 70%, the average incentive ratio is 54%. Thus, there is
a positive correlation between the level of MC participation rate and the MC incentive ratio. Second,
some specialties are known to have a relatively low productivity in terms of quantity of services. This
is the case for pediatrics since children need special care. The per diem may induce them to choose
the MC system even though their incentive ratio is quite small (14.27%). This may partly explain their
relatively high MC participation rate of 43.5%.
Table 2 shows summary statistics on practice variables for the treatment and control groups, before
and after the reform. We note that before the reform, the control group provided more services on
average (132 430 CAN$ vs 112 540 CAN$), had a larger income (212 740 CAN$ vs 178 840 CAN$) and
worked slightly fewer hours per week (54 vs 55.28) than the treatment group. These statistics indicate
that physicians who chose to remain under FFS were, on average, higher productivity physicians, in
terms of the volume of services. Consequently, the control-group physicians would have suﬀered more
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics : Practice variables by group
Control group Treatment group
Before After Before After
Mean St. Mean St. Mean St. Mean St.
Error Error Error Error
Volume 132.43 69.08 136.27 74.82 112.54 52.50 109.86 54.49
Income 212.74 78.83 214.50 84.93 178.84 68.12 200.76 63.64
Hours at work 54.00 14.04 52.29 14.04 55.28 12.65 52.38 12.82
Clinical hours 44.70 15.41 44.43 15.44 42.23 14.54 41.45 13.85
Hospital 31.02 18.79 30.59 19.48 32.53 17.87 32.83 17.37
Private clinic 13.68 15.05 13.83 15.29 9.70 14.24 8.62 13.36
Non Clinical hours 6.20 7.92 4.88 7.65 8.30 8.83 7.34 8.50
Administration 3.60 6.51 2.06 6.16 4.19 6.66 2.57 5.99
Teaching 2.59 4.04 2.82 4.26 4.11 5.20 4.78 5.72
Research hours 3.10 8.60 2.98 8.06 4.74 9.26 3.58 7.55
Notes: The cells display the average level of the practice variable in row and its st. deviation, for the control (left-hand side
columns) and treatment (right-hand side columns) groups, before (ﬁrst sub-columns) and after (second sub-columns) reform. The
Before Period is 1996-1999 (the annual CMQ surveys are conducted in July while the reform was introduced in September 1999) and
the After Period is 2000. There are 1 697 physicians in the control group and 423 in the treatment group. The period of observation
is 1996-2000, leading to N=9 238 observations. Variables: Volume and income are measured in thousands (2000) CAN$ ; hours of
work variables are measured on a weekly basis.
from the reduction of fees under the MC scheme than the treatment group. This is consistent with
the presence of a self-selection problem. Also, before the reform, physicians in the treatment group
worked less in private clinics (generally not subject to mixed compensation) and they performed more
non-clinical activities such as administrative and teaching tasks (compensated under the MC per diem).
Table 3 shows the makeup of the treatment and control groups in terms of the personal characteristics
of the physicians in our sample. The male physicians represent 81% of the control group (before the
reform) while representing 72% of the treatment group, indicating that the MC participation rate is
smaller for males than for females. Similarly francophone physicians represent 79% of the control group
and 86% of the treatment group, which indicates that the MC participation rate is higher for francophone
than for non-francophone physicians. Also, the average age of physicians in the treatment group is
smaller than that of the control group. This indicates that the MC participation rate decreases with
age. Moreover, the MC participation rate is more important in Metropolitan regions (CMA with or
without teaching university) than in smaller areas.
The statistics on volume of service, income and time-use variables in Table 2 can be directly used to
compute simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DD) estimates of the impact of the reform. However, no control
variables are taken into account in such estimates. Given the presence of a potential self-selection bias,
we will focus on econometric estimates.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics : Personal Characteristics by group
Control group Treatment group
Before After Before After
Mean St. Mean St. Mean St. Mean St.
Error Error Error Error
Sex (Male=1) 0.81 0.39 0.80 0.40 0.72 0.45 0.69 0.46
Language (French=1) 0.79 0.41 0.79 0.41 0.86 0.35 0.87 0.34
Age 5.19 2.09 5.63 2.11 4.66 1.96 5.01 1.94
CMAs with teaching university 0.73 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.78 0.41 0.77 0.42
CMAs without teaching university 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29
Census Agglomeration 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31
Other areas 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.31 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17
Regional Hospital 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.31
Supra Regional Hospital 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36
Local and regional Hospital 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.72 0.45 0.71 0.46
Other Hospital 0.10 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.03 0.16 0.10 0.31
Anesthesiology 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38
Cardiology 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20
Dermatology 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24
Endocrinology 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20
Gastroenterology 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.08
General surgery 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31
Nephrology 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10
Neurology 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17
Neurosurgery 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24
Obstetrics and gynecology 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18
Orthopaedic surgery 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20
Pediatrics 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44
Pneumology 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11
Radiation oncology 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22
Rheumatology 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24
Notes: Sample distribution over individual characteristics inside control (left-hand side column) and treatment (right-hand side)
groups, before (ﬁrst sub-column) and after (second) the reform. CMA: Census Metropolitan Areas. Age: There are 10 groups of ﬁve
years interval of age, ranked from 1 (30 years old and less) to 10 (70 years old and more).
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4 Estimation Strategy
As we seek to provide an empirical evaluation of the reform, our analysis is designed so as to measure
the eﬀect of the introduction of the MC system on physician behaviour. Our empirical strategy relies on
a panel data model approach that can be seen as a generalization of the DD approach to the estimation
of treatment eﬀects. The panel dimension of our data is used to control for sample self-selection.17 We
also account for censoring, when required, by extending this framework to a pooled Tobit model.
4.1 A panel data model with sample selection
Let yit0 denote the supply of services associated with physician i's practice at time t under the FFS
scheme. Similarly, yit1 denotes the supply of services by physician i at time t under the MC scheme.
We denote, for the present, y as a generic measure of supply. In our empirical work we will consider
speciﬁcations with the volume of clinical services, hours of work (disaggregated in various dimensions)
and earnings as our dependent variable. We specify outcomes as a set of linear regression equations:
yit0 = θt + xitβ + ci + uit0 (1)
yit1 = θt + xitβ + α+ ci + uit1, (2)
where the parameter θt denotes a time-varying intercept and xit denotes a set of observable characteristics
(such as age, specialty, gender, region, type of establishment and language). The disturbances are
broken down into two components: ci denotes an individual unobserved eﬀect that does not vary over
time while uit0 and uit1 represent temporary unobservable variables aﬀecting the outcomes under the
respective compensation systems. It is assumed that E[uit0|θ,xi, ci] = E[uit1|θ,xi, ci] = 0. Note that
equations (1) and (2) represent the distribution of outcomes in the population. As such, (2) represents
the (hypothetically) observed supply if all specialist physicians were to be paid under the MC scheme.
The eﬀect of MC on y is captured by α and is called the average treatment eﬀect (ATE) in the literature
(e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil 2001). ATE estimates the average variation in the supply of services if all
physicians change from FFS to MC as compared with no change at all. In this model, the assumption
of a common time-varying intercept under each scheme (i.e., same θt) is crucial to identifying the eﬀect
of MC on y. This parallel trend assumption will be tested for various supply of services equations in the
econometric section.
Now let yit denote the supply of services by physician i at time t under the observed payment scheme,
i.e., the scheme chosen by physician i at time t. Then, the observed outcomes are linked to the above
equations through:
yit = Dityit1 + (1−Dit)yit0, (3)
17While the decision to adopt MC was not individual based, ethical concerns prohibited us from accessing information
on the department in which an individual physician was working which would have allowed modeling the voting decision to
adopt MC. We recognize that the individual eﬀects in the empirical work could be somewhat diﬀerent if the decision was
made individual by individual rather than through this voting process. Note that the collective decision process reduces to
an individual-based decision rule if physicians are mobile enough to choose their department based on similar preferences
for MC.
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where Dit is the indicator variable of the specialist i's decision to select MC at time t. Thus in this
model, participation in the treatment group (Dit = 1) or to the control group (Dit = 0) is endogenous.18
Substituting (1) and (2) into (3) gives:
yit = θt + xitβ +Ditα+ it, (4)
where
it = ci + uit0 +Dit(uit1 − uit0). (5)
As is well known (e.g., Angrist and Imbens, 1999) standard regression methods applied to (4) gen-
erally fail to provide a consistent estimate of α due to a non-zero covariance between Dit and it. The
three components of the error term it in (5) allow identiﬁcation of the reasons for this diﬃculty. First, if
physicians diﬀer with respect to unobservable permanent elements (as represented by ci) that aﬀect their
supply of services, and if, for instance, low productivity physicians (in terms of quantity of care) prefer
the MC system, then self-selection leaves high productivity physicians under FFS and low productivity
physicians under the MC system. A comparison of productivity levels will therefore confound the eﬀects
of the compensation system with the diﬀerences in unobserved productivity. Consequently, individuals
may be more suited to one regime or the other  self-selection thus implies that E[ci|θ,xi, Dit = 0] 6= 0
and E[ci|θ,xi, Dit = 1] 6= 0.
A second problem occurs when physicians who decide to switch to MC experience a temporary change
in the supply of services just prior to the change in the compensation system, something often referred
to as Ashenfelter's Dip in the program-evaluation literature. An example would be if some physicians
temporarily suﬀer from a health problem that reduced their productivity just before switching to MC.
In this case, the ex ante comparison between groups no longer identiﬁes permanent diﬀerences between
individuals, i.e. E[uit0 | θ,xi, ci, Dit = 1] 6= 0. If the temporary divergence between groups vanishes in
post-reform periods, this diﬀerence would then be unduly attributed to the treatment. Given our panel
stretches over ﬁve years however, we are conﬁdent that we can control for any temporary changes in
supply. We therefore disregard the risk of an Ashenfelter's Dip in the analysis.
A third problem occurs when the eﬀects of the reform are not homogeneous, that is, when E[uit1 −
uit0|θ,xi, ci, Dit = 1] 6= 0. This expression represents the average unobservable change in the supply of
services for the doctors who change from FFS to MC. Conditional on ci and the explanatory variables,
the OLS coeﬃcient associated withDit will therefore estimate α˜ = α+E[uit1−uit0|θ,xi, ci, Dit = 1]. The
parameter α˜ is called the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT) in the literature (e.g. Heckman
and Vytlacil, 2001). ATT is generally diﬀerent from ATE (given here by α), the common impact of the
reform, since it estimates the average impact of the reform only for those who actually choose to change
to MC. Only when the population of physicians is homogeneous, ATT will be equal to ATE. In this
18In practice some physicians may work under both systems at the same time. Note also that, by moving from one
health establishment to another, a physician could switch back and forth from MC to FFS. A department could also switch
from one system to another by a voting decision. For simplicity, we attribute workers to the treatment group if part of
their income was earned under MC in every quarter of the year (see the discussion in Section 3.3).
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paper, we focus on the ATT's since the ATE's are not identiﬁed without imposing additional structure
to the model.
We are thus left with a self-selection problem.19A number of approaches have been developed for
controlling for this endogeneity, each of which requires diﬀerent assumptions in order to be valid. In the
health literature, the approach which has been most widely used is the instrumental variable method
(e.g. Basu et al., 2007; Devlin and Sarma, 2008). However, given the longitudinal nature of our data,
it is natural to use an alternative approach based on panel data regressions. Thus, we observe each
physician in the selected sample before and after the introduction of the MC system. We can therefore
exploit information on the supply of services prior to the introduction of the MC system to eliminate
the individual eﬀect ci which is the source of the self-selection problem. More precisely, using (4) and
(5) and the deﬁnition of α˜, the model to be estimated becomes:
yit = θt + xitβ +Ditα˜+ ci + ηit, (6)
where ηit = uit0 +Dit(uit1 − uit0)−DitE[uit1 − uit0|θ,xi, ci, Dit = 1], with E(ηit|θ,xi, ci, Dit) = 0. Our
model assumes strict exogeneity of {θt,xit, Dit} for all t, conditional on the individual eﬀect. Note that
the model does not impose the absence of correlation between the individual eﬀect and the explanatory
variables. Eq. (6) will be estimated using a ﬁxed eﬀects (or within) transformation to eliminate the
individual-speciﬁc eﬀects. Also, the absence of self-selection will be tested using a Hausman test com-
paring the coeﬃcients of the ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) model with those of the corresponding random eﬀects
model. The latter model is more restrictive since it does impose zero correlation between the observed
explanatory variables and the individual eﬀect.
When applying the FE model, the presence of heteroskedasticity of the error terms and serial corre-
lation in ηit may give an improper covariance matrix estimator (see Bertrand et al., 2004). We provide
robust standard error estimates that are valid in the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation in ηit when the length of the panel (here, equal to 5) is small (see Arellano, 1987).
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4.2 Extension to Censored Data
Some of the practice variables of interest in our study are left-censored in the sample (this is the case,
e.g., for teaching hours in 46% of the sample and for research hours in 69% of the sample). For those
variables, the FE eﬀects model estimated by OLS will be inconsistent. Moreover, a standard FE Tobit
will also be inconsistent due to the so-called incidental parameters problem; i.e., for a ﬁxed length of the
panel, the number of parameters to be estimated increases with the number of observations.
To accommodate this, we estimate the model using a pooled Tobit. Also, we add dummy variables
to account for some observable time-invariant individual variables (e.g., Treated=1 for physicians who
19Our model ignores the possibility of self-selection of patients into diﬀerent provider types. In that case, we would
expect the case-mix of physicians to change with the reform and our estimates could be biased. However, this problem is
not likely to be important since the information concerning whether a physician is FFS or MC is conﬁdential and cannot
be released to the public by the RAMQ.
20To implement the Hausman test, we use a robust form of the statistic which accounts for this problem (see Wooldridge,
2001, p.291).
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chose MC, sex, language, specialty  14 dummies). Note that, being time-invariant, these variables
are not identiﬁed under the FE model. This yields a new vector of explanatory variables, x˜it. It
is assumed that conditional on x˜it, the error term of the corresponding latent model is distributed
N (0, σ2). A useful feature of the pooled Tobit is that the estimated parameters will be consistent and
asymptotically normal even if the error terms are arbitrarily serially correlated. We provide estimates
of the standard errors of coeﬃcients robust to serial correlation of unrestricted form.21 Unlike OLS
estimates, the estimated impact of the reform diﬀers from the estimated parameters in a Tobit model.
This is computed as the average over the doctors who changed from FFS to MC of the estimate of
E(yit|θ, x˜, Dit = 1)− E(yit|θ, x˜, Dit = 0) at t = 2000 (period post-reform).
5 Results
The upper part of Table 4 provides results for all specialties in the sample, with the control group given
by specialists who remained in the FFS scheme in 2000. For all models considered, tests of parallel trend
do not reject the null hypothesis that, prior to the reform, time eﬀects (θt) were the same in both control
and treatment groups. This test is crucial for the identiﬁcation of the impacts of the reform. Moreover,
the Hausman test rejects the random eﬀects model for all OLS models.
On average physicians who changed to MC reduced their volume of billable clinical services by
8 300 CAN$,22 which represents a decrease of 6.15%. This decrease in the volume of services is accom-
panied by a reduction of 1.14 in weekly clinical hours. The reduction in the number of clinical hours is
mainly due to the reduction of 0.81 in hours worked per week in private clinics.23 This is the case since
the reform had no signiﬁcant impact on clinical time spent in hospitals.
There is also evidence that the reform addressed some of the multi-tasking problems associated with
the FFS contract. First, note that, in relative terms, the reduction in the volume of services is larger
than the reduction in clinical hours worked thus resulting in a 3.58% increase in the time spent per
service. This result is therefore consistent with MC physicians substituting quality for quantity in their
supplies of clinical services. Second, switching to the MC system caused physicians to spend more time
(0.53 more hours per week) on non-clinical activities; i.e., administrative tasks and teaching. While these
activities are important in insuring the quality of health care (both in the present and future), they are
not remunerated under the FFS system and are likely to be neglected. The measured increase, in the
order of 7.92 %, suggests that the reform had positive eﬀects in this direction as well. Notice, however,
that we are less successful in decomposing the total increase in non-clinical activities into constituent
parts, the eﬀect on administrative activities being not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
21An alternative to the pooled Tobit is the random eﬀects Tobit. However, this model imposes strong restrictions on
the variance matrix. Since this model imposes that the error terms are equicorrelated, the variance matrix will have
common diagonal entries and common oﬀ-diagonal entries. In any case, econometric investigations showed that estimated
coeﬃcients from these two models do not diﬀer very much.
22 All results in dollars are in constant (2000) CAN$. The results for weeks of work are not reported because they are
insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
23The estimated coeﬃcients on hospital hours and hours worked in private clinics do not add up to the coeﬃcient on
total clinical hours because the latter was estimated by OLS and the former were estimated by pooled Tobits.
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We also note that the reform was not cheap  according to our results, physicians who chose the MC
system beneﬁted from an increase in annual income of 17 290 CAN$; i.e., an increase of 8.05%. What
is more, the impact of the reform caused a reduction of 1.09 total hours of work per week performed by
MC physicians. As such, the reduction in the fees and the introduction of the per diem induced MC
physicians to consume more leisure. Other studies (e.g., Croxson et al., 2001), have also shown that
changes in the payments received by doctors aﬀect their number of working hours. Finally, we note
that time spent on research activities, which are not remunerated neither by the FFS nor by the MC,
decreased by 14.7%.
6 Robustness Checks
To validate our results, we performed a number of robustness tests. Our ﬁrst step in this direction was
to analyse a placebo reform, suppressing data from 1999 and 2000 and using 1998 as the post-reform
period. The coeﬃcients of the placebo variable (= 1 if treated in 1998) should not be signiﬁcant since
no true reform has been introduced during this year. If they were signiﬁcant, then it would raise the
possibility that the results of Table 4 are also signiﬁcant by mere chance. The results24 indicated that
none of the placebo coeﬃcients were signiﬁcant, which is encouraging for the validity of our estimates
of the impacts of the reform.
6.1 Changing the Control Group
Following Song and Manchester (2007), we consider how robust our results are to using a diﬀerent control
group: general practitioners who were paid exclusively on FFS contracts. As long as this control group
is aﬀected by the same economic shocks through time as are specialists who chose to be paid on a FFS
basis (the basic control group), one should expect the estimated eﬀect of the reform to be similar to the
original one. Alternatively, the general-practitioner control group may be less susceptible to confounding
forces such as general-equilibrium eﬀects or the removal of income ceilings (see below). The bottom part
of Table 4 presents the results. Generalists do not perform the same types of services as MC specialists.
Therefore, for this control group, instead of using billable services on MC to construct a measure of
volume of services, we used all services billed by general practitioners.
Our tests of parallel trend are rejected in this case for most time-use variables (except time spent
on private clinic and on administrative duties). Thus, strictly speaking, our identiﬁcation criterion fails
for this sample. This may reﬂect the fact that general practitioners do not represent a natural control
group for MC specialists. In spite of this, it is reassuring to see that the results obtained when using
generalists as the control group are qualitatively similar to those obtained when using FFS specialists.
Quantitatively there are some important diﬀerences though. Thus, using the alternative control group,
our results show that the reform reduced the volume of clinical services performed by MC specialists
by 5 700 CAN$ (or 3.9%) as compared with 8 300 CAN$ (or 6.15%) when using FSS specialists as the
24The corresponding results are available in a longer version of the paper (see Dumont et al., 2007) or directly from the
authors on request.
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control group. Also, the impact of the reform on total clinical hours per week of MC specialists is now
1.64, which is larger than the estimate obtained when FSS specialists are used as the control group
(=1.14).
However, contrary to our results with FSS specialists as the control group, MC physicians do not
seem to spend more time per service. Indeed, in percentage, the reductions in the volume (3.90%) and
in clinical hours (3.88%) are quite the same. Again, the reduction in clinical hours is mainly due to the
decrease of 1.47 hour per week in private clinics. However, contrary to the previous estimate, the number
of hours in hospitals increases now by 1.18 hour per week, indicating the possibility of a substitution
between private clinic and hospital hours. Note however that the statistic on the test of parallel trend
is very large for hospital hours which might indicate a serious problem when computing the marginal
eﬀects of the reform. Non-clinical hours per week increase by 1.12 hours which is far more important
than the growth in hours spent teaching (0.5 hours). Again, the large value of the parallel trend test
statistic suggests a problem with these results. Note however that the latter estimate is quite similar to
the one obtained when using MC specialists as the control group (=0.47). Finally, there is a diﬀerence of
6 090 CAN$ in the two estimates of the impact of the reform on the income of MC specialists. This gap
might be attributable to an increase in the income of specialists in 2000 which the general practitioners
did not enjoy.
In summary, tests of parallel trends suggest that FFS specialists are a better control group for MC
specialists than are general practitioners. However, results using general practitioners as a control group
qualitatively validate our previous results in spite of some quantitative diﬀerences: estimates of the eﬀect
of the reform increase for all variables except the volume of services. Moreover, the increase of hospital
hours is now signiﬁcant.
6.2 Heterogeneous Response
The next results in Table 5 provide an analysis of the reform by gender. They show that females (upper
part of the Table) beneﬁt more from MC than males (bottom part of the Table). First, females who
changed from FFS to MC increased their income by 20 290 CAN$ in comparison with 15 480 CAN$
for males. Second, the reduction in billable clinical services is more important for females than for
males. MC females reduce their volume of services by 8.22% as compared with 5.54% in the case of men
(10 080 CAN$ vs 7 620 CAN$). Women seem to be ﬁnancially penalized by the FFS system. They
bill fewer services than men not only because they work fewer hours than men (51.03 against 52.6 for
males) but also because, on average, they spend more time with their patients (2.76 against 3.14 for
men). The higher increase in income for females thus partly reveals that the MC system has a stronger
eﬀect on their income because their productivity (in terms of quantity of services) is lower than that
of males. The per diem beneﬁts more to physicians with lower productivity and therefore induces a
larger increase in females income. Third, the positive impact of the reform on the time spent per billable
service is higher for women (=6.39%) than for men (=2.84%). This suggests that the quality-quantity
substitution eﬀect of the reform has been more important for women than for men.
Part of the results for women can also be explained by the behaviour of MC pediatricians since
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approximately one-half of the physicians in the female treatment group are pediatricians. The results
for this specialty are presented in the upper part of Table 6. This decrease of 12 990 CAN$ (=12.8%) in
their volume of services is larger than that for all specialties (=8 300 CAN$). This decrease is mostly
explained by the reduction in time spent in private clinics (2.92 hours per week), which is almost equal
to the reduction of 2.88 in total clinical hours worked. Prior to the reform, 53% of the volume of billable
pediatric services were performed in private clinics. By reducing time spent in these clinics, the reform
has also reduced the number of services provided in them. We also observe that the MC pediatricians
did not increase the number of services provided in hospitals. Therefore, the fall in volume may only
represent a reduction in the number of services billed in private clinics. The MC pediatricians also
increased by 1.56 hours per week their time spent on non-clinical activities (administrative tasks and
teaching) and reduced by 2.01 hours a week their time spent on research. All in all, they reduced their
total hours of work by 1.87 hours per week.
The bottom part of Table 6 shows results for general surgery, another specialty which reacted strongly
to the reform. MC general surgeons decreased their volume of services by 15 320 CAN$ (= 10.7%) while
increasing their level of income by 18 370 CAN$ (= 8.14%). However, we cannot say much more about
the eﬀect of the reform on the use of their time since none of the coeﬃcients measuring the impact of
the reform is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
After removing these two specialties from the sample, the reduction in the volume of services per-
formed by MC specialists  other than pediatricians and surgeons  is less important, but still evident:25
it is 4 610 CAN$ instead of 8 300 CAN$ (or 3.32% as compared with 6.15%). On the other hand, the
impact of MC on income remains very close to the previous estimates, corresponding to an increase of
17 950 CAN$ as compared with 17 290 CAN$ for all specialties. Moreover, it seems that the reduction in
total clinical hours and in private clinic hours is mainly due to the behaviour of MC pediatricians since
none of the coeﬃcients associated with these two variables are signiﬁcant at the 5% level for the other
specialties. A similar result is obtained for research hours. In short, the reform had a more important
impact on the allocation of time for pediatrics and general surgery than for other specialties. This result
could partly be explained by the speciﬁc characteristics of these specialties.
6.3 General-Equilibrium Eﬀects
As an additional check, we considered the possible presence of general-equilibrium eﬀects (e.g., Heckman
et al., 1998). These would occur if, for example, the reduction in the volume of services on the part of the
treatment group led to an oﬀsetting increase in the volume of services among control-group physicians,
perhaps in reaction to increased waiting periods on the part of patients. The fact that the average
volume of services is higher among FFS physicians after the introduction of the reform is consistent with
this explanation which would place doubts on the validity of our control group and our measures of the
eﬀect of the reform.
Following Lewis (1963), we exploit diﬀerences in the participation rate across specialties to investigate
general-equilibrium eﬀects. If these eﬀects are important then specialties in which the participation rate
25The full results table is provided in Dumont et al. (2007).
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is highest should exhibit the largest reaction among FFS physicians (the control group). What is more,
the eﬀect of the participation rate should be of opposite sign to the measured eﬀect of the reform.
We therefore regressed the diﬀerent practice variables on the participation rate, restricting the sample
to FFS physicians. In general, there is little evidence to support the presence of general-equilibrium
eﬀects.26 The participation rate has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the volume of services provided among
FFS physicians. While it has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on hours spent seeing patients and on hours spent on
administrative duties, in both cases the sign is inconsistent with general-equilibrium eﬀects. In both
cases the coeﬃcient on participation rate has the same sign as the estimated eﬀect of the reform. Given
these results we conclude that general-equilibrium eﬀects are not a major confounding element in our
data.
6.4 Income Ceilings
Finally, we considered the eﬀect of the removal of the gross income ceiling on physician behaviour. Recall,
the government removed this income ceiling in January 1999. If this aﬀected the treatment and control
groups diﬀerently, then it would be a possible confounding eﬀect in our estimates of the compensation
system reform. However, there is little evidence to suggest that these ceilings (or their removal) had an
important eﬀect on observed physician behaviour. First, only a small number of specialists were actually
constrained by the ceiling prior to its removal. In the last semester of 1998 only 5.5% of specialists had
an income greater than or equal to the income ceiling. Second, there was no substantive change in
our results when we eliminated physicians whose income were close to the ceiling (deﬁned as having an
income greater than or equal to the ceiling minus 10 000 CAN$) from our sample.27 Given this, we are
conﬁdent that any eﬀect of the removal of the income ceilings on observed behaviour was minimal.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the labour-supply response of physicians to changes in their con-
tracts. We have combined time-use surveys with administrative payroll information to construct a panel
of labour-supply data on Quebec physicians. The comprehensive nature of these data allow us to anal-
yse labour-supply response along many dimensions and address multi-tasking issues in response to a
particular reform: the introduction of the mixed compensation system. Our results show that, on aver-
age, the reform induced physicians who changed from FFS to MC to reduce their volume of (billable)
services by 6.15%. However, they increased their time spent per service by 3.58% and their time spent
on administrative and teaching tasks (activities not remunerated under FFS) by 7.92%.
These results underline the importance of accounting for multitasking when evaluating compensation
systems; they also point to directions for future research. The increase in time spent per service is
suggestive of a quality-quantity substitution in the treatment of patients. This, coupled with the increase
in time spent on teaching and administrative duties, suggests there were positive eﬀects of the reform,
26The full results are available upon request.
27The full results are available upon request.
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at least partially meeting government objectives and oﬀsetting the reduction in services provided.28 Of
course, time spent per service is an imperfect measure of quality  physicians may simply be taking longer
breaks between services, or spending more time with patients without aﬀecting health outcomes. Further
study and more extensive data will be needed to fully settle these issues. Comparative information on
the health of patients treated by MC and FFS physicians would be useful in this regard. What is more,
a complete welfare analysis would weight the increased time spent per patient (or improvement in health
status of the patient) against extra time spent waiting to see a physician. Matching data on physician
services to waiting times would be an important step in this direction.
Finally we note that our analysis is limited to reporting the eﬀects of a particular reform  the
introduction of the MC system. Yet, policy makers may want to predict the eﬀects of other reforms,
not observed within the current data. For example, the current reform was voluntary, allowing us to
identify the eﬀect of treatment on the treated (those that chose the MC system). It identiﬁes the
average treatment eﬀect (the eﬀect that would be observed if the government made MC mandatory
for all physicians) only if those physicians who chose MC react to incentives in the same way as those
who chose FFS. If there is heterogeneity in response, then measuring the eﬀect of a mandatory reform
requires predicting how physicians, who are only observed under FFS, would react under MC. This
is not identiﬁed by the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator. Alternatively, the government may wish to
predict the eﬀects of alternative contracts. The fact that the income of physicians who switched to MC
increased by 8% suggests that the reform might have been accomplished at a lower per diem. Yet, changes
in the contract would, undoubtedly, aﬀect participation, services provided and the eﬀect of the reform.
One approach to answering such questions would be to use our data to estimate structural parameters
governing (optimal) labour-supply decisions. Within a structural model the behaviour under diﬀerent
contracts is a function of the same (utility function) parameters; identiﬁcation of those parameters
allows the prediction of behaviour under alternative policies and the evaluation the eﬀects of (as yet)
unobserved reforms. We leave this task for future research.
References
Angrist, J. D., Imbens, G. W. (1999). Comment on james j. heckman, "instrumental variables: A study
of implicit behavioral assumptions used in making program evaluations". Journal of Human Resources
34 (4), 823827.
Arellano, M. (1987). Computing robust standard errors for within-groups estimators. Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics 49 (4), 431434.
Baker, G. P. (1992). Incentive contracts and performance measurement. Journal of Political Economy
100 (3), 598614.
28Another possible beneﬁt of the reform is the reduction in induced demand. Yet, waiting lists to see specialists are very
long in Quebec. Under these circumstances, it is diﬃcult to believe that physicians feel it necessary to induce demand to
meet income targets.
23
Barro, J., Beaulieu, N. (2003). Selection and improvement: Physician responses to ﬁnancial incentives.
NBER WP (10017).
Basu, A., Heckman, J. J., Navarro-Lozano, S., Urzua, S. (2007). Use of instrumental variables in the
presence of heterogeneity and self-selection: An application to treatments of breast cancer patients.
Health Economics 16 (11), 11331157.
Bertrand, M., Duﬂo, E., Mullainathan, S. (2004). How much should we trust diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (1), 249275.
Blomqvist, A. (1991). The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical
care. Journal of Health Economics 10 (4), 411432.
Blundell, R., MaCurdy, T. (1999). Labour supply: areview of alternative approaches. In: Ashenfelter, O.,
Card, D. (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3A. Elsevier, Cambridge (MA), pp. 15591695.
Bolduc, D., Fortin, B., Fournier, M.-A. (1996). The eﬀect of incentive policies on the practice location
of doctors: A multinomial probit analysis. Journal of Labor Economics 14 (4), 703732.
Chiappori, P.-A., Salanié, B. (2003). Testing contract theory: A survey of some recent work. In: Dewa-
tripont, M., Hansen, L., Turnovsky, S. (Eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Eight World
Congress. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (MA), pp. 115149.
Croxson, B., Caroll, P., Perkins, A. (2001). Do doctors respond to ﬁnancial incentives ? uk family
doctors and the fundholder scheme. Journal of Public Economics 79 (2), 375398.
Devlin, R.-A., Sarma, S. (2008). Do physician remuneration schemes matter? the case of canadian family
physicians. Journal of Health Economics Forthcoming.
Dumont, E., Fortin, B., Jacquemet, N., Shearer, B. (2007). Physicians' multitasking and incentives:
Empirical evidence from a natural experiment. IZA Discussion Paper (3229).
Eggleston, K. (2005). Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment. Journal of Health Eco-
nomics 24 (1), 211223.
Fortin, B., Jacquemet, N., Shearer, B. (2008). Policy analysis in the health-services market: account-
ing for quality and quantity. Annales d'Economie et de Statistiques/The Annals of Economics and
Statistics Forthcoming.
Gaynor, M., Gertler, P. (1995). Moral hazard and risk spreading in partnerships. Rand Journal of
Economics 26 (4), 591613.
Gruber, J., Owings, M. (1996). Physician ﬁnancial incentives and cesarean section delivery. Rand Journal
of Economics 27 (1), 99123.
Hart, O. D., Holmstrom, B. (1987). The theory of contracts. In: Bewley, T. (Ed.), Advances in economic
Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambrdige (MA).
24
Heckman, J., Vytlacil, E. (2001). Policy relevant treatment eﬀects. American Economic Review, Papers
and Proceedings 91 (2), 107111.
Heckman, J. J., Lance, L., Christopher, T. (1998). General-equilibrium treatment eﬀects: A study of
tuition policy. American Economic Review 88 (2), 381386.
Hillman, A. L., Pauly, M. V., Kerstein, J. J. (1989). How do ﬁnancial incentives aﬀect physicians' clinical
decisions and the ﬁnancial performance of health maintenance organizations? New England Journal
of Medicine 321 (2), 8692.
Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset own-
ership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 7 (3), 2452.
Hutchinson, J. M., Foley, R. N. (1999). Method of physician remuneration and rates of antiobitic pre-
scription. Canadian Medical Association Journal 160 (7), 10131017.
Lewis, H. G. (1963). Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago (Illinois).
Léger, P.-T. (2007). Physician payment mechanisms. In: Lu, M., Jonsson, E. (Eds.), Financing Health
Care: New Ideas for a Changing Society. Wiley-VCH Press, Ch. 6.
Ma, C.-T. A. (1994). Health care payments systems: cost and quality incentives. Journal of Economics
& Management Strategy 3 (1), 93112.
Ma, C.-T. A., McGuire, T. G. (1997). Optimal health insurance and provider payment. American Eco-
nomic Review 87 (4), 685704.
Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. (1992). Economics, Organization and Management. Englewood Cliﬀs: Prentice
Hall.
Newhouse, J. P. (1996). Reimbursing health plans and health providers: Eﬃciency in production versus
selection. Journal of Economic Literature 34 (3), 12361263.
Paarsch, H., Shearer, B. (2000). Piece rates, ﬁxed wages and incentive eﬀects: Statistical evidence from
payroll records. International Economic Review 41 (1), 5992.
Pauly, M. V. (1990). The rational nonpurchase of long-term-care insurance. Journal of Political Economy
98 (1), 153168.
Song, J. G., Manchester, J. (2007). New evidence on earnings and beneﬁt claims following changes in
the retirement earning test in 2000. Journal of Public Economics 91 (3-4), 669700.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2001). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT Press.
25
